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The False Promise of Presidential Indexation 
Daniel Hemel† & David Kamin‡ 
The Trump Administration faces mounting pressure from conservative 
thinkers and activists—including calls from its own National Economic Council 
director—to promulgate a U.S. Treasury Department regulation that indexes 
capital gains for inflation. Proponents of such a move—which is sometimes 
called “presidential indexation”—make three principal arguments in favor of 
the proposal: (1) that inflation indexing would be an economic boon; (2) that the 
President and his Treasury Department have legal authority to implement 
inflation indexing without further congressional authorization; and (3) that in 
any event, it is unlikely that anyone would have standing to challenge such an 
action in court. This Article evaluates the proponents’ three arguments and 
concludes that all are faulty. First, whatever the merits of comprehensive 
legislation that adjusts the taxation of capital gains and various other elements 
of the Internal Revenue Code for inflation, rifle-shot regulatory action that 
targets only the capital gains tax would be costly and regressive, would open a 
number of large loopholes that allow for rampant tax arbitrage, and would be 
unlikely to significantly enhance growth. Second, the legal authority for 
presidential indexation simply does not exist. The Justice Department under the 
first President Bush reached the conclusion in 1992 that the Executive Branch 
cannot implement inflation indexing unilaterally, and doctrinal developments in 
the last quarter century have—if anything—strengthened that conclusion. Third, 
a number of potential plaintiffs—including a Democrat-controlled House of 
Representatives, certain states, brokers subject to statutory basis reporting 
requirements, and investment funds whose tax liability could rise as a result of 
the regulation—would likely have standing to challenge presidential indexation 
in federal court. In sum, the promise of presidential indexation turns out too 
hollow, and calls for unilateral action should be spurned. 
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Introduction 
Prominent conservative activists and commentators have pressed the 
Trump Administration in recent months to index the capital gains tax for 
inflation via executive action—a move sometimes called “presidential 
indexation.”1 In August 2017, then-CNBC commentator Larry Kudlow urged 
President Trump to “take matters into his own hands by issuing an executive 
order to index capital gains for inflation.”2 The next month, Kudlow and two 
dozen other conservative leaders sent an open letter calling on President Trump 
to index capital gains for inflation unilaterally.3 Those same leaders joined forces 
again in January 2018 to urge Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to promulgate 
a regulation that indexes capital gains for inflation.4 The push for presidential 
 
 1.   See Editorial, Presidential Indexation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1992, at A14 [hereinafter 
“Editorial, Presidential Indexation”]. To be more precise, these proposals would involve indexing “basis” 
for inflation. The Internal Revenue Code’s definition of “basis” applies both to capital and ordinary assets. 
See I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2018). We use “capital gains indexing” as a shorthand referring to indexing basis 
for both capital and ordinary assets, which would reduce the gains on both. In dollar terms, most of the 
effect would likely be on capital gains. In 2015, there were $725 billion of net capital gains reported as 
compared to $12 billion of gains on “ordinary” property. See IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., Individual 
Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Sept. 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15in13ms.xls 
[https://perma.cc/9RED-SPXW]. As noted below, indexing basis for inflation would also have a number 
of implications beyond the capital gains tax context, including for depreciation and amortization. See infra 
note 49. 
 2.   Larry Kudlow, Index Capital Gains for Inflation, Mr. President, CNBC: KUDLOW’S 
CORNER (Aug. 11, 2017, 6:17 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/11/index-capital-gains-for-inflation-
mr-president.html [https://perma.cc/6L5Q-5NBM]. 
 3.   See Rachel Slobodien, Club for Growth Leads Coalition Urging Trump to End 
Taxation of “Phantom Income;” Encourages Executive Order, CLUB FOR GROWTH (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.clubforgrowth.org/taxes/club-for-growth-leads-coalition-urging-trump-to-end-taxation-of-
phantom-income-encourages-executive-order [https://perma.cc/CA6U-J5WC]. 
 4.   Letter from Grover G. Norquist, Pres., Americans for Tax Reform, to Steven T. 
Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas. (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.atr.org/sites/default/files/assets/ATR%20letter%20to%20Treasury%20on%20Indexing%20
Capital%20Gains%20to%20Inflation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YVY-AFSE]. 
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indexation gathered even more momentum in March 2018, when President 
Trump named Kudlow to be the next director of the National Economic Council.5 
Since then, opinion-shapers in the right-leaning media have joined the chorus.6 
Kevin Brady, former chairman and now ranking Republican for the House Ways 
and Means Committee, has also backed the proposal,7 and the President has 
asked the Treasury Department to look into the idea.8 “I’m thinking about it very 
strongly,” Trump told reporters as the summer of 2018 drew to an end.9 With a 
new Democratic House majority poised to block any tax-slashing legislation, the 
indexing idea may prove even more attractive to a President who still seeks 
further cuts.10 
This is not the first time that a Republican president has faced calls from 
leading conservative thinkers and activists—including members of his own 
Administration—to index capital gains for inflation unilaterally. Tax lawyers 
with long memories may recall a similar effort during the last year of the first 
Bush Administration,11 when the President and his Treasury Secretary faced a 
drumbeat of demands for unilateral action on indexing. Paul Craig Roberts, who 
served as an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under President Reagan, wrote 
in the Washington Times in January 1992 that President Bush “can cut the capital 
gains tax unilaterally” and “would be derelict not to do so.”12 That same month, 
the Wall Street Journal editorial board enthusiastically endorsed the plan, which 
it described as a “bold move” that “would benefit both the economy and Mr. 
 
 5.   See Ryan Ellis, Larry Kudlow Should Get President Trump to Index Capital Gains 
to Inflation, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanellis/2018/03/14/larry-
kudlow-should-get-president-trump-to-index-capital-gains-to-inflation/#2e89e0243514 
[https://perma.cc/5JZ7-QCUP]; Richard Rubin, How Lawrence Kudlow’s Rise Breathes New Life into 
Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2018/03/20/how-lawrence-kudlows-rise-breathes-new-life-into-
indexing-capital-gains-to-inflation [https://perma.cc/FW9G-2D6D]. 
 6.   See Editorial, Death to the Inflation Tax, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/22/editorial-theres-evidence-that-trump-can-strike-th 
[https://perma.cc/2E49-R9J8]; Kimberley A. Strassel, Opinion, Trump Alone Can Cut Taxes, WALL ST. 
J. (July 12, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-alone-can-cut-taxes-1531436546 
[https://perma.cc/4ZKU-E2HT]. 
 7.   See Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Trump Administration Mulls a Unilateral Tax 
Cut for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/us/politics/trump-
tax-cuts-rich.html [https://perma.cc/4YX4-UPWW]. 
 8.   Phil Mattingly (@Phil_Mattingly), TWITTER (Aug. 1, 2018, 2:51 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Phil_Mattingly/status/1024714248503615488 [https://perma.cc/F4Z9-P2NE]. 
 9.   John Micklethwait, Margaret Talev & Jennifer Jacobs, Trump Says He’s Thinking 
About Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2018, 4:22 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-thinking-about-indexing-capital-
gains-to-inflation. 
 10.   Cf. Joshua Gallu, Justin Sink & Sahil Kapur, Trump’s Pre-Election Tax-Cut 
Promise Leaves GOP Leaders Baffled, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2018, 4:48 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-20/trump-says-new-tax-cut-plan-may-come-days-
before-november-vote (discussing Trump’s still ill-formed plans for further tax reductions). 
 11.   Our tax law memories do not extend that far back. Both of us were in grade school 
at the time of the 1992 debate. 
 12.   Paul Craig Roberts, Commentary, Instant Way to Cut Capital Gains Tax?, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at F1. 
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Bush.”13 Several other prominent Reagan Administration veterans sent a letter 
to President Bush in March of that year urging him to direct his Treasury 
Secretary to take immediate action.14 One outspoken member of President 
Bush’s Cabinet, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp, 
backed the idea as well.15 
The intellectual foundation of the 1992 push for presidential indexing was 
a ninety-two-page memorandum produced for the National Taxpayers Union and 
the National Chamber Foundation by three conservative attorneys at a prominent 
law firm in Washington, D.C., including two partners who had held high posts 
in the Reagan Administration Justice Department.16 To readers familiar with the 
U.S. system of separation of powers, the memorandum’s claim that the President 
could—through his Treasury Secretary—radically alter the tax treatment of 
capital gains might have seemed surprising. After all, the Constitution allocates 
the taxing power to Congress.17 And, more specifically, the Constitution requires 
that revenue-related legislation originate in the House of Representatives.18 But 
the 1992 memorandum concluded that “a regulation indexing capital gains for 
inflation should and would be upheld judicially as a valid exercise of the 
Treasury’s interpretive discretion” under the Internal Revenue Code.19 Central 
to the authors’ argument was Section 1012 of the Code, which provides that—
as a general rule—“[t]he basis of property shall be the cost of such property.”20 
The memorandum’s authors contended that the Treasury Secretary could 
promulgate a regulation interpreting “cost” to mean cost in “real” (i.e., inflation-
adjusted), as opposed to “nominal,” terms. Because the gain on an undepreciated 
capital asset generally is calculated by subtracting the basis from the sale price,21 
 
 13.   Editorial, Presidential Indexation, supra note 1, at A14. 
 14.   See Letter from Gary L. Bauer et al. to George H.W. Bush, President of the United 
States (Mar. 19, 1992), reprinted in Letter, What Bush Must Do After His Deadline, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
20, 1992, at A12. Signatories of the letter included former Secretary of Transportation James H. Burnley 
IV, former Office and Management and Budget Director James C. Miller III, and former Assistant 
Attorney General Theodore B. Olson, among others. See id. 
 15.   See Joanna Richardson, Treasury Empowered to Index Capital Gains Through 
Regulation, Study Finds, 56 TAX NOTES 1123 (Aug. 31, 1992). 
 16.   Memorandum from Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin & Vincent J. Colatriano 
to Dr. Lawrence A. Hunter, Exec. Vice Pres., Nat’l Chamber Found. 1 (Aug. 17, 1992), 
https://www.atr.org/sites/default/files/assets/shaw%20pittman%20potts.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JW-
SDGW] [hereinafter “Cooper Memorandum”]. 
 17.   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes . . . .”). 
 18.   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in 
the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other 
Bills.”). Courts uniformly have interpreted the Origination Clause to apply to bills that raise and lower 
taxes. See Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) (“We . . . conclude . . . that in 
adopting [the Origination Clause], the framers of the Constitution intended that all legislation relating to 
taxes (and not just bills raising taxes) must be initiated in the House.”); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 
203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“We cannot agree that ‘revenue-raising’ means only bills that 
increase taxes.”). 
 19.   Cooper Memorandum at 1. 
 20.   I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2018). 
 21.   See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2018). 
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the proposed reinterpretation would have the effect of incorporating an inflation 
adjustment into the taxation of capital gains.22 
The 1992 push for presidential indexation lost momentum after the 
Treasury Department’s General Counsel and the Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel both concluded that Treasury did not, in fact, have the legal 
authority to index basis for inflation via regulatory action.23 Still, the idea has 
continued to resurface since. Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole 
pledged on the campaign trail in 1996 that he would implement indexing via 
executive action in his first year in the Oval Office.24 The Wall Street Journal 
Editorial Board briefly resurrected the idea during the second President Bush’s 
second term.25 Two of the three authors of the ninety-two-page 1992 
memorandum published a “sequel” to their earlier analysis in 2012 in a law 
journal,26 when the upcoming election presented the possibility of a change in 
administration. Presidential indexation has proven to be an idea that will not die. 
Now, it is back, and supporters are especially emboldened by Kudlow’s sudden 
ascent. 
Over the years, the case for presidential indexation, as framed by its 
proponents, has been based on three core claims. First, advocates say that it 
would be good policy—it would encourage capital formation and enhance 
economic efficiency.27 Second, as noted above, advocates argue that Treasury 
has the legal authority to index basis for inflation on its own, without further 
congressional action. And third, some proponents of presidential indexation say 
that it is “unlikely that anyone would have standing to sue to block indexing.” In 
other words, whether or not presidential indexation is lawful, it probably could 
not be stopped.28 
 
 22.   In fact, because gains from the disposition of all assets are determined under these 
same rules, the plan would seemingly apply to gains from the sale of ordinary assets as well. See 
Memorandum from John A. Corry, Chair, Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Capital Gains Indexation 
by Regulation (Sept. 1, 1992) (accessed from Tax Notes database, Document 92-8222, Electronic Citation 
92 TNT 179-45) [hereinafter “NYSBA Memorandum”]. 
 23.   See Bruce Bartlett, Indexing Capital Gains by Fiat, 135 TAX NOTES 883, 884 (May 
14, 2012); Memorandum Op. for the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t Treas., 16 Op. O.L.C. 136 (1992) [hereinafter 
“Op. O.L.C.”]. Other tax scholars who engaged in the debate at the time agreed that Treasury lacked 
authority to index the capital gains tax via executive action. See Linda Galler, Chevron and the 
Administrative Regulation of Indexation: Challenging the Cooper Memorandum, 56 TAX NOTES 1791 
(1992); Lawrence Zelenak, Does Treasury Have Authority to Index Basis for Inflation, 55 TAX NOTES 
841 (1992). 
 24.   See Richard W. Stevenson, Dole Tax Plan Would Shelter Some Gains, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 23, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/23/us/dole-tax-plan-would-shelter-some-gains.html 
[https://perma.cc/EF6V-VUUZ]. 
 25.   Review & Outlook, Counting Capital Gains, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2006, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115983941679680708 [https://perma.cc/63F2-NL8E]. 
 26.   See Charles J. Cooper & Vincent Colatriano, The Regulatory Authority of the 
Treasury Department to Index Capital Gains for Inflation: A Sequel, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 
(2012). 
 27.   See, e.g., Kudlow, supra note 2 (claiming that inflation indexing “would spark a 
wave of prosperity”). 
 28.   See Editorial, Presidential Indexation, supra note 1. 
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All three of these claims were the subject of extensive discussion in 1992.29 
Yet legislative and doctrinal developments in the past quarter century have 
altered the terms of the debate in important ways. Proponents of the proposal 
believe that these changes strengthen the legal case for presidential indexation.30 
But closer inspection reveals precisely the opposite. The policy arguments for 
presidential indexation remain weak, the legal foundations are even shakier than 
they were in 1992, and it is even more likely that challengers could show that 
they have standing to bring a lawsuit that stops Treasury from implementing such 
a regulation. 
This Article seeks to puncture the myth and mystique that have come to 
surround the ill-considered notion of presidential indexation. Our analysis 
proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the policy arguments around inflation 
indexing. While legislative action that takes a comprehensive approach to 
inflation throughout the Internal Revenue Code might have merit, regulatory 
action that targets only the tax treatment of capital gains would open a wide door 
to tax arbitrage. Part II considers whether Treasury has the legal authority to 
implement indexing via regulation. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) roundly 
rejected this proposition in 1992, and that conclusion is even more emphatic 
today in light of Chevron-related doctrinal developments over the last quarter-
century. Part III asks who would have standing to challenge such a regulation. 
We identify a number of potential plaintiffs—including a Democrat-controlled 
House, certain states, securities brokers subject to statutory basis reporting rules, 
and taxpayers whose liability would rise as a result of indexing—who would 
likely satisfy the standing requirements. In short, the administration prudentially 
ought not and legally cannot index basis for inflation without an act of Congress. 
If it attempts to do so via regulation, its action likely will not stand for long. 
I. Inflation Indexing: Policy Considerations 
The basic policy argument for indexing basis to inflation is easily stated: 
without any adjustment for inflation, capital gains taxes will impose burdens on 
investors that are disproportionate to their real returns. To illustrate: imagine that 
an individual purchased a share of Company C stock for $100 when the first 
President Bush took office, and that the individual sells the stock for $200 in 
February 2019. The individual would pay tax on the $100 capital gain—a $20 
tax at the top statutory rate.31 But based on the consumer price index, $100 in 
January 1989 has the same buying power as $208.73 in February 2019.32 In 
 
 29.   See Galler, supra note 23; Zelenak, supra note 23; NYSBA Memorandum, supra 
note 22. 
 30.   See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 26. 
 31.   For arithmetic ease, the calculation excludes the 3.8% net investment income tax as 
well as state income taxes. 
 32.   U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI Inflation Calculator, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZWB-YR5A]. Some proponents of 
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inflation-adjusted terms, the individual has suffered a $8.73 loss, not a $100 gain. 
The fact that basis is not adjusted for inflation causes capital gains taxes to fall 
on “phantom” gains. 
Indexing basis for inflation would eliminate the phantom gains tax. In the 
example above, an individual who bought stock for $100 in January 1989 would 
have basis in February 2019 of $208.73. Sale of the stock would thus generate a 
$8.73 capital loss instead of a $100 gain. The tax treatment of the transaction 
would reflect the real economic consequences of the transaction. 
As a policy matter, the case for indexing basis to inflation is considerably 
stronger if it is accomplished as part of a comprehensive reform package that 
addresses and eliminates potential loopholes that indexing otherwise would 
open. Legislative indexing, moreover, could be coupled with other changes to 
the Code that offset the revenue and distributional effects of inflation 
adjustments. Even then, however, the case is not a clear one. More importantly 
for present purposes, the policy case for indexing collapses if indexing is done 
via rifle-shot regulatory action, which would generate opportunities for tax 
arbitrage, reduce revenue significantly, and deliver benefits almost exclusively 
to those at the top of the income distribution. 
A. Inflation Indexing via Comprehensive Legislative Reform 
Proposals for inflation indexing via comprehensive legislative reform—
specifically trading off higher statutory rates for inflation adjustments—have 
sparked insightful analyses from scholars and commentators on both sides of the 
indexing debate.33 If a shift toward indexing is coupled with an increase in 
statutory rates applied to the remaining gains, it can be revenue-neutral (or even 
revenue-positive) and distributionally neutral, as well. Inflation indexing via 
regulatory action would have none of those characteristics. The case for inflation 
indexing as part of a comprehensive legislative reform package like this does not 
translate into an argument for Treasury to go it alone. 
Importantly, a number of legislative proposals for inflation indexing lack 
the above-mentioned characteristics, too. For example, the Capital Gains 
Inflation Relief Act of 2018, introduced by Senators Ted Cruz and Jim Inhofe 
 
indexing have suggested that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) would be the appropriate measure for 
calculating inflation. Following the adoption of chained CPI as the relevant inflation metric for most 
inflation-indexed thresholds as part of the December 2017 tax law, see Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11002, 131 
Stat. 2054 (2017), reliance on unchained CPI for purposes of the capital gains tax would be difficult to 
defend. Because unchained CPI generally increases at a faster rate than chained CPI, the use of unchained 
CPI for capital gains tax purposes would effectively mean that wealthier taxpayers get a more favorable 
inflation metric than working families. On the implications of chained CPI for working families, see 
Chuck Marr, Instead of Boosting Working-Family Tax Credit, GOP Tax Bill Erodes It Over Time, CTR. 
FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 21, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/instead-of-
boosting-working-family-tax-credit-gop-tax-bill-erodes-it-over-time [https://perma.cc/62LH-EDQD]. 
 33.   Compare, e.g., Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 538 (1993) (pro-
indexing), with N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TAX SECTION, AD HOC COMM. ON INDEXATION OF BASIS, Report 
on Inflation Adjustments to the Basis of Capital Assets (1990), reprinted in 48 TAX NOTES 759 (1990). 
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this past April, would index basis for inflation but would not apply to interest 
income and expense.34 Thus, the arbitrage opportunities described in Section I.B 
would be possible under the Cruz-Inhofe legislation, as well. Moreover, the 
Cruz-Inhofe legislation would not raise statutory rates to offset the revenue and 
distributional effects of inflation indexing. Thus, the main arguments for 
inflation indexing via comprehensive legislative reform discussed in this Section 
do not necessarily apply to bills such as the Cruz-Inhofe proposal. Instead, the 
economic trade-offs can be similar to that for executive action discussed in the 
next Section. 
The primary arguments in favor of inflation indexing in exchange for an 
increase in tax rates are (1) that it leads to more accurate measurement of 
income;35 (2) that—when coupled with an increase in statutory rates on capital 
gains—it appropriately shifts the tax burden from the “normal” return on capital 
to the “abnormal” or “extraordinary” return; and (3) that it smooths the taxation 
of capital income over time. 
Start with the first claim: that indexing would lead to a more accurate 
measurement of income. Imagine that the inflation rate is 10% per year, that the 
tax rate is 20%, and that A and B both sell assets for $100 that they bought for 
$75. Imagine as well that A has held his asset for three years and that B has held 
her asset for one year. Without indexing, A and B each would pay a $5 tax (i.e., 
20% x ($100 – $75)). However, all but around $0.18 of A’s gain is attributable 
to inflation,36 while $7.50 of B’s gain is attributable to inflation and the 
remaining $17.50 of her gain is a real economic return.37 Taxing A the same as 
B arguably represents a mismeasurement of income because A’s real income is 
less than B’s. Indexing basis for inflation would ensure that A, whose real income 
on the transaction is close to zero, pays no tax, and that B is taxed only on the 
portion of her gain that reflects a real return. 
The second argument for inflation indexing—and, specifically, for 
indexing basis for inflation while also increasing the statutory rate on capital 
gains—is that such a shift would lead to the more appropriate tax treatment of 
abnormal or extraordinary returns (what in finance is sometimes referred to as 
“alpha”38). More of the tax burden would be borne by such extraordinary returns, 
which should tend to enhance both efficiency and fairness. 
Briefly, returns on capital investment can be disaggregated into four 
elements: (i) the effect of inflation, (ii) the real risk-free return on capital 
investment, (iii) the risk-based return on capital investment, and (iv) the 
abnormal or extraordinary return. There are a number of plausible reasons to 
 
 34.   Capital Gains Inflation Relief Act of 2018, S. 2688, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). 
 35.   See Shuldiner, supra note 33, at 548-52. 
 36.   The real gain is calculated as follows: 100 – ($75 x (1.1)3) = $0.18. 
 37.   The real gain is calculated as follows: 100 – ($75 x 1.1) = $17.50. 
 38.   See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 
188 (2008) (defining alpha); Victor Fleischer, Alpha: Labor Is the New Capital (2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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conclude that the fourth element—the abnormal return—should bear the brunt 
of the capital tax burden.39 First, taxation of abnormal returns will not distort 
investment decisions because the return represents—by hypothesis—an amount 
over and above the opportunity cost of capital. As long as the rate on abnormal 
returns is one-hundred percent or less, an investment generating such a return 
should still be attractive to the taxpayer. Second, some or all of these abnormal 
returns on capital may in fact be disguised returns to labor (e.g., returns on startup 
founders’ stock or the carried interest income of private equity and venture 
capital fund managers). There are both fairness and efficiency benefits to treating 
this disguised labor income more like other labor income with which it should 
be categorized. Third, insofar as abnormal returns represent economic rents (e.g., 
monopoly or oligopoly profits), then a tax on abnormal returns potentially deters 
socially wasteful rent-seeking behavior.40 
Indexing basis for inflation and then raising the rates on other returns to 
capital shifts the tax burden from the inflationary component to the other 
components. However, the risk-free return appears to have been shrinking and 
close to zero in recent years. Thus, the additional burden on the risk-free return 
is probably small.41 Moreover, taxpayers can—at least under certain 
conditions—eliminate the burden on the risk-based return through borrowing 
and hedging.42 Thus, in significant part, a revenue-neutral combination of 
 
 39.   There is some evidence that abnormal or extraordinary returns have been increasing 
relative to normal returns, which makes trading inflation adjustments for higher statutory rates more 
attractive. This is because taxation of extraordinary returns would then finance more of the inflation 
adjustment. For instance, looking at corporations, Treasury Department economists have estimated that 
the risk-free return comprised only twenty-five percent of the total return from capital in 2003-2013, down 
from forty percent from 1992-2002. See Laura Power & Austin Frick, Have Excess Returns to 
Corporations Been Increasing over Time?, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS 12 (Nov. 
2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-111.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CU9M-DQH2 ] (“Overall, the risk-free return fraction based on economic depreciation 
averages forty percent during the first half of the analysis and around 25 percent in the second half.”). 
Based on this, the Treasury economists conclude that “excess returns” have been increasing as a share of 
profits. Id. at 7. 
 40.   For important treatments of the taxation of capital, see, among others, Joseph 
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate 
About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital 
Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: 
A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 789 (1994); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income 
Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423 (2000); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income 
Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax, 52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996); and David A. 
Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 2-3, 24-25 (2004). 
 41.   One indication of the real risk-free return is the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury 
inflation-indexed securities. That figure was less than one percent from April 2011 through September 
2018, and below zero for a year-long period in 2012-2013. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, FRED 
Economic Data: 10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security, Constant Maturity (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFII10 [https://perma.cc/M9D7-U6UH]. There is some reason to believe 
that the long-term drop in the real risk-free rate of return to very low levels may be a continuing 
phenomenon in the United States and other advanced economies. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, 
Reflections on the New Secular Stagnation, VOXEU (Oct. 30, 2014), https://voxeu.org/article/larry-
summers-secular-stagnation [https://perma.cc/G3C3-YSAP]. 
 42.   This conclusion tends to be associated with Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave 
and their ground-breaking article exploring taxation of risk. See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, 
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inflation indexing and rate adjustments shifts the tax burden on capital from the 
inflationary component to the abnormal return, which—as discussed above—
appears to be a desirable result.43 
A final argument for inflation indexing is that it will lead to the more equal 
tax treatment of the real return to capital investment over time. By contrast, in a 
system that is not adjusted for inflation, the tax rate on the real return to capital 
investment will fluctuate with the inflation rate. In general, variance in the tax 
rate around a mean generates greater distortions than simply maintaining a 
constant tax rate at the mean.44 For the most part, this claim holds true across 
time periods, as well as across taxpayers within the same time period.45 This 
argument is tempered by the reality that, with or without inflation indexing, tax 
rates on capital investment will likely vary over time as the government’s 
revenue needs fluctuate and political conditions change. 
These benefits from indexing for inflation are potentially significant, but 
the case for legislative indexing is not overwhelming. There are some plausible 
reasons to favor a system with a lower statutory tax rate and no inflation 
adjustment, as opposed to a system with a higher statutory rate and an inflation 
adjustment. First, the nonindexation of basis potentially serves as a 
macroeconomic stabilizer, as it leads to higher effective tax rates when the 
economy is overheated (and, likewise, lower rates in deflationary environments, 
 
Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944). The Domar-Musgrave result 
is based on the assumptions that the tax rate is flat, losses are fully and immediately deductible, and 
taxpayers can scale up their investments costlessly. For an extension to environments with multiple tax 
rates, see David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 229 
(2004). 
 43.   To illustrate how an inflation-adjusted capital gains tax shifts the burden from 
inflationary returns to extraordinary returns: imagine that the inflation rate is 10%, that the real risk-free 
and risk-based returns are zero, and that the tax rate on ordinary income is 40%. Further, assume that A 
invests $100 and earns $10, all of which is attributable to inflation, while B invests $100 and earns $30, 
$10 of which is attributable to inflation and $20 of which is attributable to economic rents or disguised 
labor income. 
 Now imagine first that capital gains are taxed at a preferential 20% rate and that basis is 
not indexed. Thus, A will pay a tax of 20% x $10 = $2, and B will pay a tax of 20% x $30 = $6, for total 
revenue of $8. If instead we index basis for inflation and eliminate the preferential tax on capital gains 
(such that gains are now taxed at the 40% ordinary rate), then A will pay no tax and B will pay a tax of 
40% x $20, for total revenue of $8. The second arrangement is likely preferable to the first arrangement 
on efficiency grounds (because it eliminates the tax disincentive for saving) and on equity grounds 
(because it eliminates the difficult-to-defend tax preference for economic rents and disguised labor 
income). 
 44.   This is because the “excess burden” associated with taxation (the loss in welfare in 
addition to revenue raised) is in proportion to the square of the tax rate. See Harry Watson, Excess Burden, 
in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 121 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005). As a 
result, a capital gains tax system that varies the effective marginal tax rate based on inflation should 
produce greater excess burden than a system with the same average tax rate (and producing the same 
amount of revenue across time) but without variation based on the rate of inflation. All of the relevant 
distortions on which tax scholars focus—for instance, the distortion of the consumption-vs.-saving 
decision and the “lock-in” effect—should be larger in the system without the inflation adjustment. 
 45.   For an illustration in an analogous context, see Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, 
Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of 
Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 989-93 (1999). 
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which often correspond to recessions). Note that this argument is nearly the 
opposite of the third argument in indexing’s favor: the fact that nonindexation 
leads to differential tax rates over time is potentially a feature and not a bug. But 
this argument also assumes a correspondence between the inflation rate and the 
rate of economic growth—a correlation that does not hold in all periods (e.g., the 
“stagflation” era of the 1970s). 
Second, and perhaps most significantly, indexing basis for inflation would 
raise administrative and compliance costs for taxpayers.46 This increase in 
administrative and compliance costs would take several forms. Most basically, 
indexing basis for inflation would add further steps to the computation of capital 
gains, as taxpayers or their preparers would have to calculate the percentage 
change in the relevant inflation index from the date of acquisition to the date of 
disposition and then multiply basis by that amount—with calculation becoming 
particularly complicated when costs associated with investments are incurred 
over time such as via improvements to property.47 Indexing also would require 
taxpayers to keep careful track of the date on which they acquired or improved 
an asset, as the extent of the basis adjustment depends upon the precise holding 
period. As a New York Bar Association report predicted in 1990, this would 
likely lead to an increase in disputes between taxpayers and the IRS regarding 
the precise dates upon which assets were acquired and sold.48 And, adding to the 
headache, adjusting basis for inflation would considerably complicate the 
calculation of deductions for depreciation and amortization, which depend on the 
basis of the relevant capital asset and would thus fluctuate year to year and month 
to month depending on the inflation rate.49 
In light of these complexities, there is perhaps something to be said for our 
current approach, which affords a lower statutory rate for capital gains as a sort 
of “rough justice” that partially accounts for inflation while avoiding some of the 
administrative and compliance costs that the previous paragraph highlights. 
Whether or not to change the status quo through legislation that indexes basis for 
inflation and raises the tax rate on capital gains is thus a difficult question. But it 
is an entirely different policy question than whether inflation indexing should be 
accomplished via executive action. 
 
 46.   See Leonard E. Burman, Should Treasury Index Capital Gains?, TAXVOX (May 10, 
2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/should-treasury-index-capital-gains  
[https://perma.cc/8KL3-CFY7]. 
 47.   See id. 
 48.   See NYSBA Report, supra note 33. 
 49.   See I.R.C. § 167(c) (2018) (linking basis for depreciation purposes to “adjusted 
basis” in I.R.C. § 1011); I.R.C. § 197 (2018) (amortization); see also I.R.C. § 1011(a) (2018) (linking 
“adjusted basis” to definition of basis in I.R.C. § 1012). 
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B. Inflation Indexing via Executive Action 
The uncertain policy case for indexing basis to inflation falls apart entirely 
if it only involves adding inflation indexing for capital (and other) gains without 
any other changes to the tax system. This would be the result if indexing were 
implemented via executive action rather than legislation. Thus, indexing via 
executive action—or legislation that made a similar “rifle-shot” change—would 
be an invitation to arbitrage and would have negative implications for economic 
efficiency and tax equity. 
Proponents of executive indexing echo many of the policy arguments for 
reducing capital gains rates through rifle-shot, deficit-increasing capital gains tax 
cuts. First, they argue that capital gains taxes—including taxation of phantom 
gains—distort the consumption-savings decision. Second, and relatedly, they 
argue that the taxation of phantom gains discourages capital formation when the 
inflation rate is positive. Third, they say that the taxation of phantom gains 
exacerbates the capital gains tax’s lock-in effect. 
However, reductions in the capital gains taxes, especially via unilateral 
executive action, come with a set of overwhelming downsides. First, indexing 
basis without indexing other elements of the Code would generate widespread 
opportunities for arbitrage. To illustrate one potential arbitrage strategy: Imagine 
that a taxpayer buys an asset for $100 that is fully financed by a loan. Assume 
that the real interest rate is zero, that the inflation rate is 10%, and that the 
nominal interest rate on the loan is 10% as well. One year later, assuming no 
change in the real value of the asset, the asset will be worth $110 on account of 
inflation. If basis is indexed for inflation, the taxpayer can sell the asset for $110 
and recognize no taxable gain. Assuming that the interest is properly allocable 
to a trade or business, the taxpayer can claim an interest deduction of $10 with 
no offsetting gain, despite the fact that the taxpayer is in the same pre-tax position 
as previously.50 Put differently, the effort to eliminate the taxation of phantom 
gains leads to opportunities for the creation of phantom losses. 
The phantom loss in the previous example might be offset by a phantom 
gain for the lender, which realizes income of $10 even though it has gained 
nothing in real terms. Yet the arrangement still might be advantageous if the 
lender’s tax rate is lower than the borrower’s (and especially if the lender is a 
tax-exempt entity). Similar arbitrage opportunities exist under the current Code 
because of the preferential tax rate on long-term capital gains, but indexing basis 
for inflation exacerbates the current Code’s flaws. 
Arbitrage opportunities involving debt financing might be mitigated 
through legislation that adopts a comprehensive approach to indexing. For 
example, if the inflation component of interest were neither deductible to the 
borrower nor includible to the lender, the arbitrage opportunity laid out above 
would go away. But no one, to our knowledge, has suggested that Treasury has 
 
 50.   The text builds on an example in Shuldiner, supra note 33, at 643. 
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the legal authority to implement indexing for interest income and deductions via 
executive action. And the critical provisions governing the tax treatment of 
interest do not depend upon the definition of basis in Section 1012.51 The 
inevitably partial nature of regulatory indexing provides one powerful reason for 
Treasury to wait for legislative action rather than attempting to implement 
indexing unilaterally. 
Second, and relatedly, indexing basis for inflation via executive action 
would add significantly to the federal deficit. According to an estimate based on 
the Penn Wharton Budget Model, indexing would reduce federal revenues by 
$102 billion over a decade, before accounting for potential behavioral responses 
(including the arbitrage opportunities discussed above).52 Similarly, Leonard 
Burman at the Tax Policy Center estimates that indexing capital gains would cost 
in the range of $10 to $20 billion per year, after accounting for behavioral 
effects.53 The revenue loss conceivably could be offset by other changes to the 
Code as part of a broader legislative reform, but indexing basis for inflation via 
executive action likely would not be coupled with comprehensive changes 
elsewhere. 
Third, indexing basis for inflation via executive action would exacerbate 
already-widening wealth inequalities. According to the Penn Wharton Budget 
Model estimate, 86.1% of the tax benefits from indexing would flow to 
households in the top percentile of the income distribution, and 97.5% of the 
benefits would flow to households in the top decile.54 And, as before, these 
figures do not account for behavioral changes. As a result, the Penn Wharton 
estimates likely understate the regressivity of the indexing proposal because the 
arbitrage opportunities are greatest for taxpayers with the highest marginal rates 
(who also tend to be the taxpayers with the highest incomes). 
Fourth, any executive action to index basis for inflation almost certainly 
would apply to old investments as well as new investments. Insofar as the 
benefits of indexing flow to taxpayers who already have invested in stock, real 
estate, and other capital assets, indexing amounts to a windfall based on past 
decisions rather than an incentive for capital formation.55 And since the revenue 
loss today likely would lead to higher distortionary taxes in the future, the net 
effect is not merely a transfer to the owners of old capital but a reduction in 
economic efficiency overall. 
 
 51.   See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited) to . . . [i]nterest 
. . . .”); Id. § 163(a) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable 
year on indebtedness [subject to specific limitations] . . . .”). 
 52.   See John Ricco, Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation, PENN WHARTON BUDGET 
MODEL (Mar. 23, 2018), http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/economic-matters/2018/3/23/indexing-
capital-gains-to-inflation [https://perma.cc/K5L8-CKLT]. 
 53.   Burman, supra note 46. 
 54.   See Ricco, supra note 52. 
 55.   See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 289 (3d ed. 2004). 
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Fifth, indexing basis for inflation via executive action would do little to 
foster capital investment and economic growth—and, in fact, could do the 
opposite. Even if indexing were accomplished through a permanent legislative 
fix, it would—at most—result in a modest reduction in the cost of capital.56 Some 
or all of that impact would be offset by the “crowding out” of capital investment 
that would result from an increase in the national debt.57 And if indexing were 
accomplished via executive action, it is unlikely that investors would perceive 
the change to be permanent. A future Democratic administration could easily 
reverse the move, and—as discussed below—a court might set aside any 
regulation that allows for indexing. Accordingly, individuals and firms making 
capital investment decisions today would discount the expected after-tax benefits 
from indexation by the probability that the regulation would be rescinded by the 
time they realized gains. Thus, not only would indexing via executive action 
amount to a windfall for old capital, but it would do little to encourage new 
capital formation as long as the duration of the policy remained highly uncertain. 
Finally, implementing indexing via executive action would effectively 
“double compensate” investors for inflation. We already have made an 
adjustment—admittedly, a crude adjustment—to account for phantom gains in 
the form of the preferential long-term capital gains rate. Indexing basis for 
inflation while keeping the long-term capital gains tax rate where it is would 
arguably over-adjust for inflation’s effects. 
For all these reasons, we think that the policy case for indexing basis to 
inflation via executive action is quite weak. There is a stronger argument for 
indexing as part of a revenue-neutral or revenue-positive reform effort that also 
addresses arbitrage opportunities, incorporates changes elsewhere to offset the 
regressive distributional effects, and limits the benefit of indexing to new 
investment. But advocates of regulatory indexing cannot free-ride on the policy 
arguments for legislative indexing, because comprehensive legislative indexing 
is a fundamentally different proposition than regulatory indexing. And whatever 
one thinks of legislative indexing, regulatory indexing is—in our view—
irresponsible tax policy. 
II. The Flawed Legal Case for Indexing via Executive Action 
We have argued that the Treasury Department ought not seek to index the 
capital gains tax via regulatory action. But if Treasury disregards our policy 
advice, does it have the legal authority to accomplish indexing via regulation? 
This Part considers the legal foundation for indexing via executive action. We 
conclude that the Treasury and Justice Departments under the first President 
 
 56.   Jane G. Gravelle, Indexing Capital Gains Taxes for Inflation, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV. 14-15 (July 24, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45229.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SMG-QW8Q] 
(estimating that indexing would reduce the cost of capital net of depreciation by 0.06% to 0.07%, or 6 to 
7 basis points). 
 57.   Id. at 15. 
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Bush correctly determined that the legal authority for regulatory indexation 
simply does not exist. Developments since 1992 have only bolstered that 
conclusion. 
A. Round One: The 1992 Debate 
We start by articulating the argument for the proposition that Treasury has 
the legal authority to index basis for inflation via regulation. Section 1012 of the 
Code, first enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1918, says that in general, “[t]he 
basis of property shall be the cost of such property.”58 “Cost,” at least according 
to the proponents of presidential indexation, is an ambiguous term. The Chevron 
doctrine generally applies to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
language.59 Courts reviewing agency interpretations under Chevron apply a two-
step analysis. At step one, courts ask whether the statute is indeed “silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”60 If the statute speaks clearly, then 
“that is the end of the matter” under Chevron, “for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”61 
But if the statute is ambiguous, the court then moves to Chevron step two and 
asks whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”62 If so, the court will defer to the agency’s view. A Treasury 
regulation that interpreted “cost” in Section 1012 to mean cost in real terms (i.e., 
after adjusting for inflation) would be a “permissible construction” and thus 
would—according to the proponents—pass muster under Chevron. 
This was the argument that advocates of presidential indexation made 
during the first Bush Administration,63 and this is the argument that OLC roundly 
rejected.64 OLC’s analysis started with the “fundamental canon of statutory 
construction” that unless otherwise defined, the words of a statute take on their 
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”65 OLC consulted dictionaries from 
the time of the Revenue Act of 1918 as well as more recent editions and observed 
that the first and most common meaning” of the term “cost” is “price paid.”66 In 
“normal usage,” according to OLC, “price paid” means price in nominal—as 
opposed to inflation-adjusted—terms.67 
OLC’s analysis did not rest entirely—or even primarily—on dictionary 
definitions of “cost.” OLC also looked to contemporaneous Treasury 
pronouncements, subsequent court decisions, other Internal Revenue Code 
 
 58.   I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2018). 
 59.   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 60.   Id. at 843. 
 61.   Id. at 842-43. 
 62.   Id. at 843. 
 63.   See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 16. 
 64.   Op. O.L.C., supra note 23. 
 65.   Id. at 140 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 66.   Id. at 141-43. 
 67.   Id. at 143. 
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provisions, interpretive canons, and legislative history to support its conclusion 
that Treasury lacks the authority to index basis for inflation via executive action. 
As for the contemporaneous Treasury pronouncements, OLC noted that Treasury 
regulations pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1913 had interpreted the term “cost” 
to mean “actual price paid.”68 Congress in 1918 legislated against that regulatory 
background and, as OLC noted, has continued to reenact the tax laws “without 
disturbing Treasury’s interpretation of ‘cost.’”69 OLC also pointed to a long line 
of court decisions interpreting the word “cost” to mean the amount paid, without 
adjustment for inflation.70 OLC further observed that Section 1016 of the Code 
includes more than two dozen specific adjustments to basis, but no adjustment 
for inflation. Further, under a common canon of interpretation, OLC noted, “the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”71 Relatedly, OLC 
emphasized that Congress has enacted specific provisions elsewhere in the Code 
that provide for inflation adjustments in other contexts (e.g., indexing the bracket 
thresholds, the amount of the standard deduction, and the amount of personal 
exemptions).72 “Again,” according to OLC, “we would expect that if Congress 
intended that asset costs be indexed for the calculation of capital gains, it would 
have done so explicitly and in the same manner as these many other indexing 
provisions.”73 
As for the legislative history of the capital gains provisions, OLC noted that 
Congress in 1918 “must have been extremely well aware of the problems of 
inflation when it adopted the Act” because the inflation rate at the time was 
eighteen percent.74 Lawmakers at the time recognized that the capital gains tax 
would burden taxpayers who held assets that had appreciated in nominal but not 
real terms. Nonetheless, Congress rejected proposals that would have offset this 
burden by limiting the capital gains tax.75 In subsequent legislation, Congress set 
the tax rate on capital gains below the tax rate on other items of income precisely 
because lawmakers recognized that some capital gains reflected phantom gains 
due to inflation.76 Moreover, Congress repeatedly reenacted the tax laws without 
overriding Treasury’s interpretation of “cost”—a fact that, in light of the familiar 
 
 68.   Op. O.L.C., supra note 23, at 144 (quoting T.D. 2005, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. Ill, 
112 (1914), restated, T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 272-73 (1914)). 
 69.   Id. at 144 n.16. 
 70.   See id. at 144-46 (collecting sources). 
 71.   Id. at 147. This is known as the expressio unius canon of interpretation, and it 
represents “the principle that when a statutory provision explicitly expresses or includes particular things, 
other things are implicitly excluded.” JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 279 (3d ed. 2017). 
 72.   See id. at 147-48 (citing, inter alia, I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 63(c)(4), 151(d)(4)). 
 73.   Id. at 148. 
 74.   Id. at 152-53. 
 75.   See id. 
 76.   See id. at 155-56 (citing, inter alia, S. Rep. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 
(1978)). 
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legislative reenactment doctrine, served to bolster OLC’s conclusion.77 For these 
reasons and others, OLC concluded that “the term ‘cost’ as used in section 1012 
is not ambiguous” and that it unambiguously disallows indexing basis for 
inflation.78 
B. Round Two 
OLC’s opinion did not settle the indexing question, however. In 2012, two 
of the three authors of the 1992 memo that prompted the initial OLC opinion, 
Charles Cooper and Vincent Colatriano, published a “sequel” in which they 
recapitulated their earlier argument.79 Cooper and Colatriano pointed to three 
developments that, in their view, “have strengthened support” for the proposition 
that Treasury has the legal authority to index basis for inflation via regulatory 
action.80 
1. Verizon Communications and the Meaning of “Cost” 
The first of these developments, chronologically, was the Supreme Court’s 
2002 decision in a non-tax case, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission.81 That case involved the FCC’s interpretation of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which allowed new entrants to pay “just 
and reasonable” rates for access to local telephone networks controlled by 
incumbent Bell System companies. Section 252(d)(1) of the 1996 law mandates 
that “the just and reasonable rate . . . shall be . . . based on the cost (determined 
without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing 
the interconnection or network element.”82 The FCC, in a 1997 rule, interpreted 
the term “cost” to mean the “forward-looking economic cost” to the Bell System 
company, rather than the “historical” cost incurred by the company.83 Verizon 
and other Bell System carriers challenged the FCC’s interpretation as an 
unreasonable reading of the new Section 252(d)(1). 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, rejected Verizon’s 
argument. That opinion is potentially relevant to the controversy over indexing 
because of Justice Souter’s extensive discussion of the meaning of the word 
“cost” in the Telecommunications Act’s “just and reasonable rate” provision. 
Central to Justice Souter’s analysis is a 1944 Supreme Court decision, Federal 
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,84 which involved the interpretation 
 
 77.   See id. at 144 n.16 (citing, inter alia, Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 
560-62 (1991)). 
 78.   Op. O.L.C., supra note 23, at 158. 
 79.   See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 26. 
 80.   Id. at 490. 
 81.   535 U.S. 467 (2002). 
 82.   47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (2018). 
 83.   Verizon Communications, 535 U.S. at 495-96. 
 84.   320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
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of similar “just and reasonable” rate language in the Natural Gas Act. The Court 
in Hope Natural Gas held that “the fixing of ‘just and reasonable’ rates . . . 
involves a balancing of the investor and consumer interests”85 and need not be 
tethered to the “original cost” incurred by a utility.86 
We quote Justice Souter’s opinion at length because of the significance that 
indexing proponents assert that it holds in the latest round of the indexing debate. 
According to Justice Souter: 
The incumbents . . . contend that “cost” in the statute refers to “historical” cost, 
which they define as “what was in fact paid” for a capital asset . . . . The 
incumbents have picked an uphill battle. At the most basic level of common 
usage, “cost” has no such clear implication. A merchant who is asked about “the 
cost of providing the goods” he sells may reasonably quote their current wholesale 
market price, not the cost of the particular items he happens to have on his shelves, 
which may have been bought at higher or lower prices . . . . 
What is equally important is that the incumbents’ plain-meaning argument 
ignores the statutory setting in which the mandate to use “cost” in valuing network 
elements occurs. First, the Act uses “cost” as an intermediate term in the 
calculation of “just and reasonable rates,” and it was the very point of Hope 
Natural Gas that regulatory bodies required to set rates expressed in these terms 
have ample discretion to choose methodology. Second, it would have been 
passing strange to think Congress tied “cost” to historical cost without a more 
specific indication, when the very same sentence that requires “cost” pricing also 
prohibits any reference to a “rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding,” each 
of which has been identified with historical cost ever since Hope Natural Gas was 
decided. 
The fact is that without any better indication of meaning than the unadorned term, 
the word “cost” in § 252(d)(1), as in accounting generally, is a chameleon, a 
virtually meaningless term . . . . Words like “cost” give rate setting commissions 
broad methodological leeway; they say little about the method employed to 
determine a particular rate. We accordingly reach the conclusion . . . that nothing 
in § 252(d)(1) plainly requires reference to historical investment when pegging 
rates to forward-looking “cost.”87 
Cooper and Colatriano argue that Verizon Communications provides a 
powerful boost to the argument that Treasury has the legal authority to index the 
capital gains tax via regulation. In their view, “the Court’s decision wholly 
eliminates the fundamental premise of the OLC’s dictionary-driven ‘plain-
meaning’ analysis in its 1992 opinion.”88 On further reflection, however, Verizon 
 
 85.   Id. at 603. 
 86.   See id. at 596-600, 605-07. 
 87.   Verizon Communications, 535 U.S. at 497-501 (citations and some internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 88.   Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 26, at 504. 
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Communications does little to advance the argument in favor of presidential 
indexation for two reasons. 
First, while Verizon Communications confirms that the dictionary 
definition of “cost” is not controlling, that proposition does little to disturb 
OLC’s analysis, which was not (contra Cooper and Colatriano) “dictionary-
driven.” Dictionaries—contemporaneous and current—were only one among the 
many categories of sources that OLC consulted in concluding that “cost” in 
Section 1012 does not mean inflation-adjusted price. As noted above, OLC’s 
analysis rested as well on contemporaneous Treasury regulations, subsequent 
court decisions, interpretive canons, and legislative history, all of which 
bolstered OLC’s determination that Section 1012 does not allow for inflation 
indexing. 
Second, the Court’s opinion in Verizon Communications is entirely 
consistent with—and, indeed, supportive of—OLC’s view that the meaning of a 
statutory provision depends upon context above all else. Indeed, the Court in 
Verizon Communications said that the “statutory setting” is “equally important” 
as common usage in understanding the meaning of the term “cost.”89 And the 
statutory settings of the term “cost” in Section 1012 of the Internal Revenue Code 
and Section 252(d)(1) of the Telecommunications Act could not be more 
different. As for the former, the term “cost” in Section 1012 is part of a statute 
that provides dozens of specific adjustments to basis (but no adjustment for 
inflation) as well as several inflation-indexing provisions (but no inflation-
indexing provision for basis). As for the latter, the term “cost” in Section 
252(d)(1) is part of the definition of a statutory term that had long been 
understood to mean something other than historical cost. While Cooper and 
Colatriano repeatedly quote Justice Souter’s statement that “cost” is a 
“chameleon,”90 they overlook the fact that chameleons change their colors based 
on their environment, and the words “cost” in Sections 1012 and 252(d)(1) have 
very different statutory backgrounds. 
To the extent that Verizon Communications stands for the proposition that 
“cost” does not always mean “price paid,” the proposition is itself banal. When 
Blaise Pascal said that “[k]ind words do not cost much, yet they accomplish 
much,”91 he of course was not referring to the cost of kind words in historical 
dollars (or francs). So, too, when W.E.B. Du Bois said that “[t]he cost of liberty 
is less than the price of repression,”92 and when Winston Churchill said that 
“[w]e shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be.”93 Insofar as Verizon 
Communications confirms that the meaning of “cost” is contextual, it confirms 
what was already known. And, as the OLC memo explained in detail, the context 
 
 89.   Verizon Communications, 535 U.S. at 499. 
 90.   See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 26, at 502-03, 523. 
 91.   BLAGO KIROV, BLAISE PASCAL: QUOTES & FACTS 27 (2016). 
 92.   WILLIAM EDWARD BURGHARDT DU BOIS, JOHN BROWN 383 (1909). 
 93.   THE WORLD’S GREAT SPEECHES 439 (Lewis Copeland et al. eds., 1999) (quoting a 
speech delivered by Winston Churchill on June 4, 1940). 
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surrounding the word “cost” in Section 1012 suggests that no inflation 
adjustment is permitted. 
2. Brand X and the Implications of Precedent 
A second development that Cooper and Colatriano argue is significant is 
the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in National Cable & Telecommunications 
Association v. Brand X Internet Services, a case that—like Verizon 
Communications—involved the FCC’s interpretation of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.94 Another provision of that law subjects 
providers of “telecommunications services” to common carrier regulations.95 At 
issue in Brand X was whether cable modem services fall within the statutory 
definition of “telecommunications services.” In a 2000 decision, the Ninth 
Circuit had answered that question in the affirmative.96 In 2002, however, the 
FCC ruled that cable modem services are not “telecommunications services” 
within the meaning of the statute. The Ninth Circuit thereafter declined to apply 
Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation and struck down the 2002 FCC 
ruling. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was whether the Ninth 
Circuit should have reviewed the FCC’s 2002 ruling under the Chevron 
framework notwithstanding the fact that the agency ruling contravened the Ninth 
Circuit’s prior statutory interpretation.97 
The Supreme Court said that the Ninth Circuit should have given Chevron 
deference to the FCC. Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion, 
announced what has since become known as the Brand X doctrine: “A court’s 
prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves 
no room for agency discretion.”98 In other words, if a court at time 1 says that a 
statute means P and an agency at time 2 says that the statute means Q, a court at 
time 3 should defer to the agency’s interpretation (assuming that the 
interpretation is otherwise Chevron-eligible) unless the court at time 1 had said 
that the statute unambiguously means P. 
According to Cooper and Colatriano, “Brand X confirms that a Treasury 
reinterpretation of cost to provide for indexation would be entitled to Chevron 
deference notwithstanding prior lower court decisions adopting the historical 
‘purchase price’ interpretation of cost.”99 That conclusion is dubious for two 
reasons. First, the Supreme Court at least arguably has held that Section 1012 is 
unambiguous. Second, even if the Supreme Court had not addressed the 
 
 94.   545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 95.   47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2018). 
 96.   See AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-80 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 97.   Brand X Internet Serv. v. F.C.C., 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 98.   Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. at 982. 
 99.   Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 26, at 490. 
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question, that fact alone would not allow Treasury to claim Chevron deference 
for the novel interpretation of Section 1012 that Cooper and Colatriano urge 
Treasury to adopt. 
On the first point, the most relevant Supreme Court case construing Section 
1012 is Koshland v. Helvering, a 1936 decision.100 The taxpayer in Koshland 
bought preferred stock in Columbia Steel Corporation in the mid-1920s for 
roughly $91 per share. For several years, Columbia Steel paid a dividend to its 
shareholders in the form of common stock. Then, in 1930, Columbia Steel 
redeemed the preferred stock for $105 per share. The taxpayer took the position 
that he had a gain of approximately $14 per share ($105 minus $91). The 
Commissioner, citing Treasury regulations, argued the taxpayer’s basis in the 
preferred stock should be reduced by the value of the common stock that he 
received as a dividend, such that the gain per share would be greater than $14.101 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Owen Roberts, rejected the 
Commissioner’s position and ruled for the taxpayer. Again, the Supreme Court’s 
specific language is relevant, so we quote it at length: 
The property disposed of was the petitioner’s preferred stock. In plain terms the 
statute directs the subtraction of its cost from the proceeds of its redemption, if 
the latter sum be the greater. But we are told that Treasury Regulations long in 
force require an allocation of the original cost between the preferred stock 
purchased and the common stock received as dividend. And it is said that while 
no provision of the statute authorizes a specific regulation respecting this matter, 
the general power conferred by the law to make appropriate regulations 
comprehends the subject. Where the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful 
construction, a clarifying regulation or one indicating the method of its 
application to specific cases not only is permissible but is to be given great weight 
by the courts . . . . But where, as in this case, the provisions of the act are 
unambiguous, and its directions specific, there is no power to amend it by 
regulation. Congress having clearly and specifically declared that in taxing 
income arising from capital gain the cost of the asset disposed of shall be the 
measure of the income, the Secretary of the Treasury is without power by 
regulatory amendment to add a provision that income derived from the capital 
asset shall be used to reduce cost.102 
Concededly, Koshland does not address inflation specifically. But it does 
say that the predecessor to Section 1012 is “unambiguous,” that its instructions 
are “plain,” and that Treasury has “no power to amend it by regulation.”103 These 
statements arguably could support the conclusion that even after Brand X, 
Section 1012 is an instance in which the agency is hemmed in by judicial 
 
 100.   298 U.S. 441 (1936). The relevant provision at the time was Section 113(a) of the 
Revenue Act of 1928, which for all intents and purposes is identical to the current Section 1012(a). 
 101.   See Comm’r v. Koshland, 81 F.2d 641, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1936), rev’d, 298 U.S. 
441. 
 102.   298 U.S. at 446-47 (emphasis added). 
 103.   Koshland, 298 U.S. at 446-47. 
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precedent. They certainly undermine any claim based on Verizon 
Communications that “cost” in Section 1012 is an infinitely elastic term. 
Other cases provide additional support for the view that Treasury’s hands 
are tied. The Seventh Circuit said in a 1939 case that it “must follow” from 
statutory language and Supreme Court precedent that gain from the sale of 
securities should be calculated based on the “number of dollars,” 
notwithstanding changes in the gold content of U.S. currency.104 The Fifth 
Circuit, for its part, has said that it is “frivolous” to argue that inflationary gain 
can be excluded from income, though it said that in the context of interest income 
rather than the sale of a capital asset.105 And the Ninth Circuit has held (albeit in 
a nonprecedential opinion) that the claim that the capital gains provisions allow 
for inflation indexing is “meritless.”106 
An even more fundamental flaw in Cooper and Colatriano’s interpretation 
of Brand X is that Brand X nowhere says what they want it to say: that “[b]ecause 
no previous judicial decisions conclusively hold that the term ‘cost’ 
unambiguously precludes indexation, . . . a Treasury reinterpretation of cost to 
provide for indexation would be entitled to Chevron deference.”107 All that 
Brand X establishes is that a prior judicial interpretation of the statute in question 
does not preclude Chevron deference unless the court holds that the statute is 
unambiguous; there remains the question of whether the agency is entitled to 
Chevron deference in the first instance. Put differently, even if no court has held 
that the statute unambiguously means P, an agency interpretation of the statute 
to mean Q will not receive Chevron deference if, in fact, the statute 
unambiguously means P. 
Thus, if OLC’s analysis was correct in 1992 (as we believe it was), Brand 
X changes nothing. In fact, the OLC opinion relied on legal arguments entirely 
consistent with the holding in Brand X, and it did not argue that the longstanding 
interpretation was unchangeable simply because it was longstanding. If 
anything, Brand X provides an additional argument in favor of OLC’s conclusion 
that OLC itself did not make108: that under the Brand X standard, the Court’s 
decision in Koshland removes the interpretation of “cost” in Section 1012 from 
Treasury’s discretion. 
 
 104.   Bates v. United States, 108 F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1939). 
 105.   See Stelly v. Comm’r, 804 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 106.   See Oswald v. IRS, No. 88-6153, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 23686, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 11, 1989) (describing as “meritless” the claim that the capital gains provisions allow for inflation 
adjustment). 
 107.   Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 26, at 490. 
 108.   OLC, in fact, never cited Koshland in its 1992 opinion—a fact to which we attach 
little significance other than that the Office was synthesizing an extraordinary amount of legal material 
under time pressure. 
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3. Mayo Foundation and the Evolution of Chevron 
The third development highlighted by Cooper and Colatriano is the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & 
Research v. United States.109 In Mayo Foundation, the Court cleared away 
lingering confusion as to whether the Chevron framework applies to tax 
regulations. It does. “The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply 
with full force in the tax context,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous 
Court.110 But OLC assumed in its 1992 opinion that Chevron applies to tax; 
Mayo Foundation simply confirms what OLC took for granted. 
The “principles underlying . . . Chevron,” moreover, do not command 
application of the two-step Chevron framework in all cases involving agency 
interpretations of statutes. Over the last quarter-century, the Court has retreated 
from Chevron in important respects. This retreat began with the Court’s 1994 
decision in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.111 and culminated in 
its 2015 decision in King v. Burwell,112 with several other significant steps along 
the way. The basic idea across this line of cases is that linguistic ambiguity on 
its own does not trigger Chevron deference. Instead, courts must consult 
contextual clues and common sense before concluding that Congress has 
delegated a decision of “vast economic and political significance” to an 
agency.113 
Start with MCI. The case involved Section 203 of the Communications Act 
of 1934, which requires communications common carriers to file tariffs (i.e., 
price schedules) with the FCC and allows the FCC to “modify” any tariff filing 
requirement “for good cause shown.”114 In 1992, the FCC issued an order 
exempting all long-distance carriers other than AT&T from the tariff filing 
requirements. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the FCC’s 
statutory authority to “modify” tariff filing requirements allowed the 
Commission to exempt a large category of carriers from those requirements 
altogether. The Court concluded that the FCC had exceeded the statute’s bounds, 
rebuffing the Commission’s request for Chevron deference. As Justice Scalia 
wrote for a majority of the Court: 
Rate filings are, in fact, the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated industry. It 
is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an 
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency 
discretion—and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a 
subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements . . . . What we 
 
 109.   562 U.S. 44 (2012). 
 110.   Id. at 55. 
 111.   512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 112.   135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 113.   See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
 114.   47 U.S.C. § 203(a)-(b) (2018). 
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have here, in reality, is a fundamental revision of the statute . . . . That may be a 
good idea, but it was not the idea Congress enacted into law in 1934.115 
The key word in MCI—“modify”—is, of course, not the same as the 
contested term “cost” in Section 1012. Nonetheless, much of Justice Scalia’s 
analysis in MCI can be applied to the indexing debate. Whether to adjust basis 
for inflation is no doubt an “essential characteristic” of a capital gains tax, and it 
seems highly unlikely that Congress would have delegated the decision of 
whether or not to index to the Treasury Department with such a subtle device as 
the word “cost.” Insofar as MCI indicates a reluctance on the part of courts to 
accord Chevron deference to regulations that make a “fundamental revision to 
the statute,” MCI suggests that Treasury would face an uphill battle in securing 
Chevron deference for a regulation that indexes basis for inflation. 
MCI’s suggestion that some questions are simply too fundamental to the 
statutory scheme to merit Chevron deference drew further support six years later 
in Brown & Williamson. The question in that case was whether the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, which authorizes the FDA to regulate “drugs,” thereby gives 
the agency authority over tobacco products.116 The FDA claimed that it did and 
argued that its 1996 regulations restricting the sale and distribution of tobacco 
products were entitled to Chevron deference. The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument for a number of reasons, one of which was the sheer significance of 
the prospect of FDA regulation of tobacco. As Justice O’Connor wrote for a 
sharply divided Court, “we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to 
the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such 
economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”117 She went on 
to say that “[a]s in MCI, we are confident that Congress could not have intended 
to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency 
in so cryptic a fashion.”118 
Following MCI and Brown & Williamson, scholars of administrative law—
led by Cass Sunstein—recognized these cases as articulating what would come 
to be known as the “major questions” doctrine.119 And the Supreme Court, for 
its part, continued to rely on the “major questions” rationale in a series of 
decisions denying Chevron deference to agency interpretations. In the 2006 case 
Gonzales v. Oregon,120 the Court considered the Attorney General’s attempt to 
“deregister” physicians who participated in a state-sanctioned physician-assisted 
 
 115.   MCI, 512 U.S. at 231-32. 
 116.   21 U.S.C. § 321(g). Also at issue was whether the FDCA authorizes the FDA to 
regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as drug delivery “devices.” 
 117.   FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
 118.   Id. at 160. 
 119.   See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236-42 (2006); see 
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suicide program. While the Controlled Substances Act gives the Attorney 
General the power to revoke a physician’s registration if the Attorney General 
determines that the physician’s registration is “inconsistent with the public 
interest,”121 the Court concluded that the Attorney General’s actions exceeded 
the scope of his statutory ambit. Citing Brown & Williamson, Justice Kennedy 
wrote for a majority of the Court that “[t]he idea that Congress gave the Attorney 
General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation in the 
CSA’s registration provision is not sustainable.”122 He went on to say that “[t]he 
importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide . . . makes the oblique form 
of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”123 
The “major questions” rationale returned eight years later in Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA.124 Among the issues in Utility Air Regulatory Group 
was whether the Clean Air Act allows EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from “millions of small sources—including retail stores, offices, apartment 
buildings, shopping centers, schools, and churches.”125 The Court declined to 
accord Chevron deference to the agency’s assertion of regulatory authority over 
these small sources. “When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute 
an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy,” 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, “we typically greet its announcement with 
a measure of skepticism.”126 Citing Brown & Williamson, he added: “We expect 
Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast 
economic and political significance.”127 
Most recently, in King v. Burwell,128 the Court invoked the “major 
questions” doctrine in deciding whether taxpayers were entitled to premium 
assistance credits for purchasing health insurance on federally established 
exchanges under the Affordable Care Act. Although the Court ultimately sided 
with the government’s argument, it declined to accord Chevron deference to 
Treasury’s regulation on point. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority: 
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-
step framework announced in Chevron . . . . This approach is premised on the 
theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress 
to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there 
may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an 
implicit delegation. This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s 
key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the 
price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are 
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available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep economic and political 
significance that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign 
that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.129 
In our view, the advent of the major questions doctrine is the most 
significant post-1992 doctrinal development bearing upon the legality of the 
presidential indexation proposal. And it does not bode well for the idea. While 
the exact boundaries of the major questions doctrine remain unclear, there are 
compelling arguments that the decision to index basis for inflation or not should 
qualify as a major question. This adds yet another reason to believe that Treasury 
does not have discretion to choose to index basis for inflation. 
First, the sheer magnitude of the change counsels against Chevron 
deference. While the major questions doctrine turns on more than dollars and 
cents, the fact that the change would potentially come with a price tag of $10 
billion to $20 billion per year, according to analysts at Penn Wharton and the 
Tax Policy Center, strengthens the case that this question is “major.”130 Another 
way to look at this is in terms of the change in the tax rate on gains. Analyzing 
IRS data from 2012, Leonard Burman at the Tax Policy Center estimates that 
one-third of gains that year represented “inflationary” gains. Thus, if gains had 
been indexed to inflation, the effective tax rate would have been cut by one-third 
that year.131 
The oblique nature of the putative delegation offers a second argument 
against Chevron deference. Application of the major questions doctrine depends 
not only on the magnitude of the issue but also on the words that Congress uses. 
Where the language that supposedly delegates vast authority to the agency is 
“subtle” or “cryptic,”132 courts hesitate before concluding that those words effect 
an extraordinary transfer of power. As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in 
Whitman v. American Trucking Association, citing to both MCI and Brown & 
Williamson: “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory 
scheme in vague terms . . . . [I]t does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.”133 And as we have emphasized, indexing basis for inflation would 
indeed be an elephant. 
Third, the “common sense” approach to Chevron deference adopted by the 
majority in Brown & Williamson cuts against claims made by presidential 
indexation’s proponents.134 It simply belies common sense to conclude that 
Congress would delegate to Treasury what is essentially135 a binary choice: cut 
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the effective tax rate on capital gains by one-third or not at all. And it especially 
strains credulity to think that Congress would want Treasury to have this choice 
with respect to capital gains but not to interest, given the gaming opportunities 
that emerge when indexing applies to one and not the other. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court’s “major questions” precedents all 
pre-date the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy and the confirmation of 
Brett Kavanaugh to the bench. And Kavanaugh, as a D.C. Circuit judge, 
embraced an especially robust view of the major questions doctrine.136 In a 
dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in a case involving the FCC’s net 
neutrality order, then-Judge Kavanaugh argued that the major questions (or 
“major rules”) doctrine should operate as a limit not only on Chevron deference 
but on agency rulemaking authority. In his view, “while the Chevron 
doctrine allows an agency to rely on statutory ambiguity to issue ordinary rules, 
the major rules doctrine prevents an agency from relying on statutory ambiguity 
to issue major rules.”137 
The difference between the Court’s articulation of the “major questions” 
doctrine in the line of cases culminating in King and Kavanaugh’s “major rules” 
variant is subtle but significant. Applied to inflation indexing, the Supreme 
Court’s major questions doctrine suggests that Treasury would not receive 
Chevron deference for its interpretation of Section 1012 if inflation indexing is 
“a question of deep economic and political significance that is central to th[e] 
statutory scheme.”138 But Treasury still might argue for a lesser level of 
deference,139 or might argue that its reading of the statute is simply the best 
interpretation of the language. Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s framing of the “major 
rules” doctrine suggests that Treasury would have to surmount a higher hurdle: 
it would have to show not only that its interpretation of Section 1012 is the best, 
but also that Congress has “clearly authorize[d] the agency” to implement 
inflation indexing.140 
Kavanaugh, to be sure, is only one Justice on a nine-member Court. But he 
is not the only one of the nine to advocate for a narrow view of Chevron’s scope. 
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Justice Thomas has complained of the Executive Branch “exploit[ing] our 
practice of deferring to agency interpretations of statutes.”141 Justice Gorsuch, 
while a Tenth Circuit judge, warned that Chevron could “permit executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power 
and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to 
square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”142 Chief Justice Roberts, 
though slightly more muted in his criticism of Chevron, has expressed concern 
over “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.”143 
Justice Breyer has been a Chevron skeptic from the start, writing more than thirty 
years ago (while he was still a First Circuit judge) that “[i]f taken literally,” 
Chevron “suggests a greater abdication of judicial responsibility to interpret the 
law than seems wise.”144 
In sum, the argument that an inflation indexing regulation would receive 
Chevron deference is not only at odds with existing doctrine but also in tension 
with the judicial zeitgeist—which at the moment is decidedly anti-Chevron. 
Even Justices who might be ideologically sympathetic to inflation indexing are 
likely to greet Treasury’s assertion of interpretive authority with skepticism. 
While Cooper and Colatriano write that post-1992 judicial developments 
“remove[] any doubt as to the application of Chevron to judicial review of 
Treasury regulations interpreting the Code,” we believe that Treasury’s potential 
bid for Chevron deference to an inflation indexing regulation is, if anything, even 
more of a long shot today than it was a quarter century ago.145 
III. Standing to Challenge an Inflation Indexing Regulation 
The analysis above leads us to conclude that Treasury lacks the legal 
authority to index the capital gains tax for inflation via regulatory action. But 
what if it tried? Would anyone have standing to challenge Treasury’s regulation 
in court? 
Commentators considered this question during the 1992 debate and—for 
the most part—answered it in the negative. The Wall Street Journal editorial 
board, in advocating for the proposal, said that it was “unlikely that anyone 
would have standing to sue to block indexing.”146 Lawrence Zelenak, though 
sharply critical of the idea, acknowledged that “[d]espite the invalidity of 
regulatory indexing, indexing would probably be immune from judicial 
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challenge.”147 He reasoned that “[a]bsent deflation, indexing could work only to 
the advantage of particular taxpayers, and without a disadvantaged taxpayer 
there would almost certainly be no one with standing to challenge the new 
regulation.”148 Harry Gourevitch of the Congressional Research Service 
similarly concluded that “it is doubtful a private plaintiff would be able to gain 
access to a Federal court to challenge the lawfulness of the regulation,” though 
Gourevitch noted the possibility that a member of Congress might have standing 
to sue on the theory that the executive action “nullified his voting power.”149 
Even absent standing to challenge, Treasury would be acting contrary to 
statute if it were to unilaterally index basis to inflation, and that should be reason 
alone for Treasury not to pursue this course. In addition, we are more sanguine 
about the possibility of a successful challenge in court. At least four types of 
plaintiffs plausibly have standing to sue in the event that Treasury tried to 
implement inflation indexing via executive action. First, House Democrats could 
potentially claim legislative standing based on recent Supreme Court and D.C. 
federal district court decisions recognizing the right of lawmaking bodies to sue 
for certain separation-of-powers violations. Second, states that have tied their 
own income taxes to the federal income tax might have standing to challenge a 
hypothetical Treasury action. Third, brokers subject to basis reporting 
requirements could credibly claim injury on account of indexing. Fourth, a small 
set of taxpayers whose liability would potentially rise as a result of inflation 
indexing could challenge the regulation in a Tax Court petition or refund suit. 
And in addition to the above-mentioned plaintiffs, organizations that can receive 
tax-deductible contributions might be able to make out a colorable argument for 
standing—though this theory of standing is rather less certain than the others. 
A. Legislative Standing 
The case law on legislative standing, as one commentator has observed, 
“contains various inconsistent pronouncements, rendering it difficult or 
impossible to discern a coherent doctrine.”150 The Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on the subject came in a 2015 case that pitted the Arizona 
Legislature against the state’s Independent Redistricting Commission. There, the 
Legislature challenged a state law that authorized an independent commission to 
draw congressional district lines after the decennial census—arguably in 
contravention of the federal Constitution’s Elections Clause, which provides that 
 
 147.   Zelenak, supra note 23. 
 148.   Id.; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the 
Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 837 n.29 (1999). 
 149.   HARRY G. GOUREVITCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE QUESTION OF INDEXING 
CAPITAL GAINS BY REGULATION (1992) (accessed from Tax Notes database, Document 92-8298, 
Electronic Citation 92 TNT 182-185). 
 150.   See Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 SO. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2016). 
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“[t]he Times, Place and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”151 
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld the state’s redistricting procedure, but 
only after the majority concluded that the state Legislature had standing to bring 
the challenge. 
In reaching that conclusion, the majority—in an opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg—applied a rule derived from earlier cases that “legislators whose votes 
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have 
standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into 
effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”152 The 
Court distinguished the Arizona Legislature’s lawsuit from earlier cases brought 
by individual members of Congress challenging alleged institutional injuries.  
The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented, but only 
Scalia and Thomas said that the Legislature lacked standing in the case.153 The 
silence of Roberts and Alito on the standing question arguably suggests that they 
agreed with the majority’s view, which—in any event—is now binding 
precedent.154 
Legislative standing returned to the limelight later that same year in a case 
involving the Affordable Care Act.155 After a Republican-controlled House 
refused to appropriate funds for certain “cost-sharing” subsidies to insurers, the 
Obama Administration disbursed the monies anyway, claiming that it had 
statutory authority notwithstanding congressional opposition. The House voted 
225-201 to authorize legal action against the President and other executive 
branch officials to stop the payment of the subsidies.156 The House then filed a 
suit against Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell in federal 
district court in Washington, D.C., teeing up the legislative standing issue. 
The district court concluded that the House did indeed have standing to 
challenge the cost-sharing subsidies. As Judge Rosemary Collyer wrote: 
The Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal) is the only body 
empowered by the Constitution to adopt laws directing monies to be spent from 
the U.S. Treasury. Yet this constitutional structure would collapse, and the role 
of the House would be meaningless, if the Executive could circumvent the 
appropriations process and spend funds however it pleases. If such actions are 
 
 151.   Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 152.   Id. at 2655 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997)). 
 153.   See id. at 2677 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 154.   Justice Alito, for his part, had indicated in a solo dissent two years earlier that a 
single House would have standing to defend an act of Congress from constitutional attack. United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 803-07 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 155.   U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 156.   H.R. Res. 676, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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taken, in contravention of the specific proscription in [the Appropriations Clause], 
the House as an institution has standing to sue.157 
One can imagine an analogous argument in the inflation indexing context. 
Say that Treasury takes regulatory action to index basis for inflation. The 
Democrat-controlled House could and likely would argue—just as the 
Republican-led House did in the cost-sharing case—that the regulation 
encroaches upon its institutional authority. Judge Collyer’s logic would seem to 
apply four-square: Congress is the only body empowered by the Constitution’s 
Origination and Taxing Clauses to adopt laws raising or lowering taxes;158 if the 
executive could circumvent that legislative process, “the constitutional structure 
would collapse;” and thus if the executive circumvents that process, either the 
House or the Senate as an institution would have standing to sue. To use the 
language from the Arizona redistricting case: legislators whose votes would have 
been sufficient to defeat indexing by statute would have standing to sue if 
indexing goes into effect, on the grounds that their votes have been completely 
nullified by the Administration’s decision to proceed without congressional 
approval. 
While the House’s case would be strong, it is not open-and-shut. For one, 
the Arizona redistricting case involved both houses of the state legislature 
authorizing a suit; with Republicans a majority in the Senate until at least 2021, 
this hypothetical lawsuit would almost certainly have to come from the 
Democrat-controlled House alone. And while the cost-sharing case involved a 
single chamber of Congress, that case was settled on terms that made the district 
court’s holding nonprecedential.159 In any event, a decision by a federal district 
court does not bind other federal courts—nor does it even bind other judges in 
the same district. Also, while the Court’s logic in the Arizona redistricting case 
would point toward the House having standing, the Court, in a cryptic footnote, 
suggested that its decision on state legislative standing may not fully translate 
into the federal context.160  
 
 157.   House of Representatives, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 71 (citations omitted).  
 158.   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in 
the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other 
Bills.”); art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . .”). Note that courts 
have interpreted the Origination Clause to apply to bills that raise and lower taxes. See Armstrong v. 
United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) (“We . . . conclude . . . that in adopting [the Origination 
Clause], the framers of the Constitution intended that all legislation relating to taxes (and not just bills 
raising taxes) must be initiated in the House.”); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam) (“We cannot agree that ‘revenue-raising’ means only bills that increase taxes.”). 
 159.   Settlement Agreement, U.S. House of Representatives v. Hargan, No. 16-5202 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2017). 
 160.   The majority wrote that “[t]he case before us does not touch or concern the 
question whether Congress has standing to bring a suit against the President,” and noted that such a case 
“would raise would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here.” Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 n.12  (2015). 
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In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Arizona redistricting litigation 
and the D.C. federal district court’s cost-sharing ruling suggest that a Democrat-
controlled House would have a plausible argument for standing to challenge a 
Treasury regulation that indexes basis for inflation. Still, complete confidence in 
the House’s success on the standing issue would be misplaced. 
B. States 
The states are a second set of potential plaintiffs in a legal challenge to 
presidential indexation.  
The crux of the states’ case for standing would be as follows: Most states 
tie their definition of income for state income tax purposes to the federal 
definition.161 For instance, many states simply start their tax calculation with 
federal adjusted gross income or taxable income—either of which automatically 
would include the effects of presidential indexation.162 Indexing basis for 
inflation via regulation would reduce the federal adjusted gross income and 
taxable income of taxpayers with capital gains, so it would reduce the amount 
those taxpayers pay to their states as well. As a result, presidential indexation 
would lead to revenue losses for the states. Undoing this would require the states 
to both change their laws and increase their (and their taxpayers’) administrative 
costs, as taxpayers would need to separately report capital gains to state 
authorities (using a different definition than at the federal level). 
Until relatively recently, the notion that a state might have standing to 
challenge a federal tax change because of its incidental effect on state tax 
revenues might have seemed like a nonstarter under longstanding precedent. In 
the 1927 case Florida v. Mellon, the Supreme Court considered a superficially 
similar challenge by the State of Florida to a provision of the federal estate tax.163 
The challenged provision allowed a credit against the federal estate tax for 
inheritance taxes paid to the states, up to eighty percent of the amount of the 
federal tax.164 Florida, which had no inheritance tax, argued that the provision 
“constitute[d] an invasion of the sovereign rights of the state and a direct effort 
 
 161.   See, e.g., 3 ILL. COMP. STAT. 203(e)(1) (2018); see also Ruth Mason, Delegating 
Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1275 (2013) (“Thirty-five of the 
forty-one states with broad-based income taxes use federal definitions of income as the starting point for 
calculating residents’ taxable income.”). 
 162.   See Nicole Kaeding & Kyle Pomerleau, Federal Tax Reform: The Impact on 
States, TAX FOUND. 16 (2016), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20170316133143/Tax-Foundation-
FF543.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW2V-M4JP ] (cataloguing linkages between state and federal income tax 
systems). In some cases, the state codes conform on a rolling basis, automatically incorporating statutory 
changes at the federal level as they occur; in other cases, they conform to the federal code as of a specific 
date. Id. Even states that conform to the code as of a specific, prior date would likely be affected by 
presidential indexation because the definition of basis in Section 1012, which presidential indexation 
would reinterpret by fiat, is a longstanding feature of federal tax law. 
 163.   273 U.S. 12 (1927). 
 164.   See id. at 15 (citing Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 301, 44 Stat. 9, 69-70). 
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on the part of Congress to coerce the state into imposing an inheritance tax.”165 
Florida also claimed that it would be injured because the estate tax “will result 
in the withdrawal from Florida of several million dollars per annum and thus 
diminish the revenues of the state derived largely from taxation of property 
therein.”166 
Rather than reaching the merits of Florida’s coercion claim, the Court 
dismissed the state’s challenge on standing grounds. As Justice Sutherland wrote 
for the Court, “[i]f, as alleged, the supposed withdrawal of property will diminish 
the revenues of the state, non constat [(i.e., it is doubtful)] that the deficiency 
cannot readily be made up by an increased rate of taxation.”167 In other words, 
the potential reduction in state revenue as a result of the federal estate tax was 
not enough to establish state standing when the state could make up for the 
shortfall through other means. 
And so things stood for the next half century. In a 1976 case, the Supreme 
Court held that Pennsylvania lacked standing to challenge a New Jersey tax on 
nonresidents (including Pennsylvania residents) on grounds that the tax violated 
the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses.168 
Pennsylvania claimed that it was harmed by the New Jersey tax because 
Pennsylvania provides its residents a credit against state income taxes for taxes 
paid to other states; thus, the fact that Pennsylvania residents paid more to New 
Jersey meant that they paid less to Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court rejected 
Pennsylvania’s argument based on logic similar to its Florida v. Mellon holding. 
“[N]othing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to 
New Jersey,” the Court noted, adding that “[n]o State can be heard to complain 
about damage inflicted by its own hand.”169 
But the tide would soon turn. First, in 1992, the Supreme Court considered 
Wyoming’s challenge to an Oklahoma law that required coal plants in the Sooner 
State to rely on in-state sources for at least ten percent of their coal.170 Wyoming, 
a coal-producing state, imposes a severance tax on coal extracted within its 
borders, and the fact that Oklahoma utilities would have to buy more Oklahoma 
coal likely meant that they would purchase less from Wyoming. The Supreme 
Court held that Wyoming had standing “where its severance tax revenues are 
directly linked to the extraction and sale of coal” and “have been demonstrably 
affected” by the Oklahoma law.171 The fact that Wyoming could have replaced 
its coal severance tax revenues with higher taxes on other commodities did not 
enter into the Court’s analysis. 
 
 165.   Id. at 16. 
 166.   Id. at 15-16. 
 167.   Id. at 18. 
 168.   Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 662-63 (1976). 
 169.   Id. at 664. 
 170.   See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1992). 
 171.   Id. at 450. 
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The Court took a further step toward broadening state standing fifteen years 
later. In 2007, it held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s 
rejection of a rulemaking petition that asked the agency to regulate greenhouse 
gases under the Clean Air Act. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
observed that Massachusetts had a “well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign 
territory” in the face of global warming and rising sea levels.172 He also noted 
that Massachusetts owns “a great deal” of land that could be affected by global 
warming, and that the Clean Air Act allows parties (including states) to challenge 
the rejection of rulemaking petitions.173 In a line that would be widely repeated 
and dissected in the years to come, Justice Kennedy concluded, “Given that 
procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign 
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis.”174 
This new “special solicitude” for the states has been a subject of extensive 
scholarly commentary175—and, increasingly, a subject of litigation. One of the 
most significant lower court cases on state standing in the last decade involved 
the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) 
program. In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security announced that parents 
of U.S. citizens and Green Card holders who met certain criteria could apply for 
two-year “deferred action” status, which would—among other potential 
benefits—allow those individuals to obtain work authorization.176 Texas and 
twenty-five other states sued to stop DAPA from taking effect, alleging that the 
program was fatally flawed on procedural, statutory, and constitutional 
grounds.177 
One of the many questions in the DAPA case was whether the states had 
standing to sue. The Fifth Circuit concluded that at least one state—Texas—did. 
The court began its analysis by invoking the “special solicitude” line from 
Massachusetts v. EPA.178 It then noted that under current Texas law, the state 
would be obligated to issue drivers’ licenses at a discount to individuals with 
deferred action status under DAPA, leading to a revenue loss of several million 
dollars.179 The court acknowledged the Obama Administration’s argument that 
Texas might be able to change its law so that individuals with deferred action 
 
 172.   Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
 173.   See id. at 519-20. 
 174.   Id. at 520. 
 175.   For discussions of this subject, see, for example, Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still 
in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061, 1071-78 (2009); and Dru Stevenson, Special 
Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 176.   Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon 
Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24W5-4LXP]. 
 177.   Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 149-50 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 178.   Id. at 151 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520). 
 179.   See id. at 155. 
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status would not be eligible for a driver’s license discount. But the court went on 
to say that “[a]lthough Texas could avoid financial loss by requiring applicants 
to pay the full costs of licenses, it could not avoid injury altogether,” adding that 
“[s]tates have a sovereign interest in the power to create and enforce a legal 
code.”180 
The Fifth Circuit then sought to reconcile the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey with its holding in Wyoming v. Oklahoma. It noted 
two relevant distinctions. First, Wyoming sued in response to a “major” change 
in Oklahoma’s policy, whereas Pennsylvania was not responding to a significant 
shift in New Jersey’s tax laws.181 Second, Wyoming had “limited” options for 
responding to the Oklahoma in-state purchasing requirement, whereas 
Pennsylvania could have achieved its revenue-raising goals in “myriad ways.”182 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas’s case more closely resembled 
Wyoming’s than Pennsylvania’s. 
Our own interest, for present purposes, is not to critique the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis but to imagine how it might apply to a state seeking to block Treasury 
from indexing the capital gains tax via regulation. The state would argue that, 
like Texas’s revenue loss from issuing discounted drivers’ licenses, it will lose 
revenue because its residents will report less income. While a state could avert 
this outcome by de-linking its own definition of income from the federal 
definition, that alternative would require state residents to bear the additional 
compliance cost of recalculating their capital gains (and would likely require 
state tax officials to bear additional administrative costs as well). Moreover, 
presidential indexation would be a sudden and major change, and states that 
wanted to avert revenue losses without incurring additional administrative costs 
or imposing additional compliance costs on their residents would have limited 
options. The case for state standing under Texas v. United States thus seems 
strong. 
Importantly, Texas v. United States is not a nationally binding precedent. 
While the Supreme Court took up the DAPA case, it ultimately split 4-4 and 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision without an opinion of its own.183 Thus the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision does not bind beyond the Fifth Circuit states of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—none of which are especially likely to bring 
an action against a hypothetical Trump Administration regulatory indexing 
policy.184 Even so, Texas v. United States constitutes persuasive authority 
 
 180.   Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 181.   See id. at 158. 
 182.   Id. 
 183.   United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 184.   Mississippi has a Democratic Attorney General who is facing reelection in 2019 
and reportedly considering a run for Governor. See GOP Rep. Mark Baker Running for Attorney General; 
Hood Undecided, MISS. BUS. J. (May 1, 2018), http://msbusiness.com/2018/05/gop-rep-mark-baker-
running-for-mississippi-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/3M9P-S2YB]. Louisiana has a Democratic 
Governor. If either asked us for political advice, we would have to tell them that filing a lawsuit against a 
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outside the Fifth Circuit,185 and we expect that other courts would at least look 
to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in adjudicating a state challenge to presidential 
indexation. While the ideological valence of the Texas case is obviously quite 
different, Texas provides solid support for the proposition that if Treasury sought 
to index the capital gains tax via executive action, states with income taxes tied 
to the federal definition of income would have standing to sue. 
C. Brokers 
Brokers are a third potential category of plaintiffs in a legal challenge to 
presidential indexation. The argument for broker standing draws force from the 
basis reporting provisions adopted by Congress in 2008.186 The 2008 law 
generally requires brokers to report to the IRS the adjusted basis of securities 
sold by their customers.187 The law applies only to stock acquired after 2010 
(with later onset dates for other securities),188 but the basis reporting regime is 
now approaching full steam and applies to a significant number of brokers and 
transactions.189 
Any one of the thousands of brokers in the United States thus could 
challenge presidential indexation in court. The broker’s argument would be that 
indexing—combined with the statutory basis reporting provisions—requires the 
broker to bear additional costs in calculating and reporting basis to customers 
and the IRS. The costs may be modest, but as one scholar has observed and the 
Supreme Court has repeated, “an identifiable trifle is enough for standing.”190 
Treasury might try to preempt a broker suit by granting regulatory exemptions 
from the basis reporting requirements, though those exemptions might be 
challenged as well (either by customers or by states). 
D. Taxpayers Who Are Harmed 
A fourth set of potential challengers to presidential indexation encompasses 
taxpayers who could be harmed by the change. This situation would be relatively 
unusual since taxpayers, if affected, would normally see a tax cut from 
 
Trump Administration policy that reduces taxes for their constituents is not an electorally wise strategy in 
states that Donald Trump won by double digits in 2016. 
 185.   See Otter v. Jewell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 117, 124 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that “Texas 
v. United States . . . constitutes persuasive authority for this Court”). 
 186.   Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 403(a), 
122 Stat. 3584 (codified at I.R.C. § 6045(g)-(h) (2018)). 
 187.   Id. 
 188.   I.R.C. § 6045(g)(3)(C) (2018). 
 189.   See Tara Siegel Bernard, New Laws Take Guesswork Out of Investment Tax 
Liability, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/your-money/new-tax-laws-
cover-cost-basis-of-investments.html [https://perma.cc/68EY-SDQM]. 
 190.   United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 
669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 
601, 613 (1968)). 
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presidential indexation. But a small set of taxpayers would potentially face 
greater liability as a result of indexation, and these taxpayers would have a 
straightforward standing claim. 
One relatively clear way in which indexation might hurt a taxpayer is if the 
taxpayer runs up against the charitable contribution deduction caps in Section 
170.191 For example, imagine a single taxpayer in the 35% ordinary income tax 
bracket and the 15% capital gains bracket who starts out with adjusted gross 
income of $600,000 and contributes well over $400,000 to charity.192 Under 
current law, the taxpayer’s charitable contribution deduction is capped at 60 
percent of adjusted gross income—$360,000 in this example.193 Now imagine 
that the same taxpayer sells a capital asset which she has held for more than one 
year that has nominally risen $10,000 in value—but the entire gain is attributable 
to inflation. Without indexing, the taxpayer pays an additional $1,880 in long-
term capital gains and net investment income taxes194 but is eligible to claim an 
additional $6,000 charitable contribution deduction, which on its own reduces 
her tax liability by $2,100. The net effect of the tax on the gain and the benefit 
from the deduction is a $220 reduction in tax liability. With indexing, the 
taxpayer neither has to pay tax on the gain nor receives the benefit of the 
additional charitable contribution deduction—and is, on net, worse off as a 
result.195 
Another circumstance in which presidential indexation might lead to an 
increase in liability involves real estate investment trusts (REITs). A REIT is an 
entity that generally must derive at least 95% of its gross income from dividends, 
interest, rents from real property, gains from the sale of certain capital assets, and 
a number of other specific sources.196 For an entity near the 95% threshold, 
inflation indexing could reduce its gain from the sale of capital assets and thus 
cause it to fail the REIT qualification test.197 A similar situation exists for 
regulated investment companies (RICs), which must derive at least 90% of their 
income from dividends, interest, gains from the sale of stock and securities, and 
 
 191.   See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (2018) (prescribing instances in which charitable 
contribution deductions are capped at twenty percent, thirty percent, and sixty percent of adjusted gross 
income). 
 192.   A single individual would find herself in this position if she had taxable income of 
$204,100 to $434,550. See Rev. Proc. 2018-57, 2018-49 I.R.B. 827. 
 193.   See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(G) (2018) (capping the deduction for cash contributions to 
public charities at sixty percent from 2018 to 2025). 
 194.   This figure accounts for 3.8% net investment income tax, which applies to married 
couples filing jointly if adjusted gross income exceeds $250,000. See I.R.C. § 1411 (2018). 
 195.   A similar example is noted in Peter J. Reilly, Treasury Capital Gain Indexing: 
Who Can Sue?, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2018/08/26/treasury-
capital-gain-indexing-who-can-sue/#4256965c42b9 [https://perma.cc/N9SA-ZGPY] (quoting Email 
from Daniel Hemel to David Kamin & Peter Reilly (Aug. 26, 2018; 4:23 PM)). 
 196.   I.R.C. § 856(c)(2) (2018). 
 197.   This possibility is mentioned in passing in the NYSBA Memorandum, supra note 
22, at n.6. 
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several other sources.198 In either case, the tax consequences of losing REIT or 
RIC status would likely exceed the tax savings from any reduction in gross 
income attributable to basis indexing. 
There are still additional conceivable circumstances—identified by other 
commentators—in which indexing basis for inflation could potentially redound 
to a taxpayer’s detriment.199 If one of these individuals or entities were to 
challenge her tax liability, a court could decide, on the merits, whether 
presidential indexation is legal. In a country with more than 150 million 
taxpayers filing returns each year,200 it seems quite likely that at least a few 
would emerge as potential petitioners or refund claimants. 
E. Charitable Organizations 
Charitable organizations exempt from federal income tax under Section 
501(c)(3) constitute a final set of potential plaintiffs in a legal challenge to 
presidential indexation. The argument for charity standing is colorable though 
far from certain. It arises from the fact that Section 170 allows taxpayers to claim 
a charitable contribution deduction for the fair market value of property such as 
stock that is donated to a public charity, provided that any gain from the sale of 
the stock would be long-term capital gain.201 This rule strengthens the tax 
incentive for charitable giving. To illustrate: imagine again that the ordinary 
income tax rate is 40% and the long-term capital gains rate is 20%. Taxpayer T 
buys stock for $50 more than a year ago that is worth $100 today. The taxpayer 
either can (a) sell the stock and pay tax of 20% x ($100 sale price – $50 basis) = 
$10, or (b) donate the stock to charity and claim a charitable contribution 
deduction worth 40% x $100 = $40. The delta between (a) and (b)—i.e., the tax 
incentive to give to charity—is $50. 
Now imagine that presidential indexation raises T’s basis in the stock from 
$50 to $60. Option (b) remains the same—donating the stock generates a 
charitable contribution deduction worth $40—but option (a) has changed. With 
indexing, T can sell the stock and pay a tax of 20% x ($100 sale price – $60 
basis) = $8, rather than $10 as before. The delta between (a) and (b)—the tax 
incentive to give to charity—has fallen from $50 to $48. The change may seem 
slight, but in some cases it may be quite substantial. If all of the long-term capital 
gain with respect to an asset is inflationary gain, then indexing eliminates the 
 
 198.   See I.R.C. § 851(a) (2018); NYSBA Report, supra note 33, at n.6. 
 199.   For other circumstances in which having less income might lead to the payment of 
more tax, see NYSBA Memorandum, supra note 22, at n.6. See also Reilly, supra note 195 (giving 
example of gains that unlock two different forms of accrued losses—capital losses and passive losses—
and that, if reduced by indexation, could increase tax liability). 
 200.   See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX RETURNS 2016, 6 tbl.A (revised Sept. 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1304.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8LKM-LADD]. 
 201.   See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (2018). Contributions of stock to a private foundation 
also may be deducted at fair market value under certain circumstances. See § 170(e)(5). 
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additional tax incentive for charitable contributions of appreciated assets (over 
and above the incentive for cash gifts). 
Can a charity go to court to challenge a regulation that does not raise the 
charity’s tax bill but makes contributions to the charity less attractive? Perhaps 
the strongest support for that proposition is a case involving a state plaintiff: 
South Carolina v. Regan.202 That case involved a statutory change to Section 
103, the provision allowing an exemption for interest on (some) state and local 
bonds.203 Specifically, Congress in 1982 eliminated the exemption for interest 
on bonds issued in bearer form. South Carolina, which issued bearer bonds, 
challenged the new law as a violation of the Tenth Amendment and the doctrine 
of intergovernmental tax immunity.204 
The new bearer-bond law did not require South Carolina to pay additional 
tax. The law did, however, make it less attractive for investors to give their 
money to South Carolina in exchange for bearer bonds, because the interest 
earned by the investor now would be subject to federal tax. That was enough to 
convince the Court to reach the merits. And while the Court’s decision focuses 
on the Tax Anti-Injunction Act rather than standing, South Carolina v. Regan is 
illustrative of the proposition that when a tax law change makes it less attractive 
for taxpayers to give money to an entity, the entity has standing to sue.205 
Concededly, the argument for charity standing might be criticized on the 
grounds that it proves too much. If charities have standing to challenge 
regulatory action that lowers the capital gains tax (and thus makes contributions 
to charities less attractive), then why can’t charities challenge any regulatory 
action that reduces marginal rates? Or, beyond that, why can’t charities challenge 
any regulatory action that affects whether taxpayers claim the standard deduction 
or itemize (on the grounds that itemizers have a stronger tax incentive for 
charitable giving). One response is that the “causation” element of the standing 
rubric alleviates these concerns somewhat: to establish standing, a charity will 
still have to show that it suffers an injury that is “fairly traceable” to the action 
in question.206 Whether this response will convince a court remains to be seen. 
What we can say for now is that charities have a colorable claim to standing that, 
at the very least, could allow them to prevail before a sympathetic court. 
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F. Role of the Anti-Injunction Act 
Looming over any challenge to presidential indexation is an 1867 federal 
law known as the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, which provides (with exceptions not 
applicable here) that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.”207 We 
discuss the Anti-Injunction Act only briefly because its implications for the 
indexing debate are slight, except when it comes to taxpayers like those 
described in Section III.D who are directly harmed by the regulation and have a 
greater liability as a result. 
As a textual matter, most legal challenges to indexing—all of those 
described above except the circumstances involving direct taxpayer harm—
would not seem to fall within the Anti-Injunction Act’s ambit. That is because 
they would not be suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax”—the goal would be to get the IRS to assess and collect 
more tax.208 More importantly, the Supreme Court held in South Carolina v. 
Regan that the Anti-Injunction Act “was intended to apply only when Congress 
has provided an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its claims on 
its own behalf.”209 If lawmakers, states, charities, and brokers aggrieved by 
presidential indexation would have no other avenue to challenge Treasury’s 
action, then the Anti-Injunction Act does not appear to bar their suit. For other 
potential plaintiffs—such as taxpayers who unlock additional charitable 
contribution deductions with higher adjusted gross income, or REITs or RICs 
that potentially flunk the relevant qualification tests due to inflation indexing—
a challenge to the indexing regulation might have to await a Tax Court petition 
or a refund claim. Regardless, the breadth of potential plaintiffs suggests that a 
regulation indexing basis for inflation could not escape legal challenge forever. 
Proponents of presidential indexation who believe that executive action would 
be immune from judicial review are, we think, quite likely to be disappointed. 
Conclusion 
While the prospect of presidential indexation may continue to generate 
enthusiasm, we think that the proposal’s promise is—excuse the pun—wildly 
inflated. As a policy matter, indexing basis for inflation via regulatory action 
would be a recipe for arbitrage, revenue losses, and even wider wealth inequality. 
As a legal matter, the same arguments that led officials in the first Bush 
Administration to reject the idea in 1992 are applicable today. These arguments 
are bolstered by the advent of the “major questions” exception under Chevron. 
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And opponents of presidential indexation also can rely on judicial and legislative 
developments that expand the pool of potential plaintiffs who can challenge an 
indexing rule. In sum, the Trump Administration ought to resist calls for it to 
assert its putative authority to implement indexing unilaterally. And if it 
succumbs to the pressure, we think that courts ought to and likely will restore the 
century-old interpretation of “cost” in the Code. 
 
 
